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The semi-industrialized economy to be discussed here mainly imports
raw materials and capital goods and is past the stage of using quantitative
restrictions for import substitution of consumer goods. Traditionally it
depended mainly on primary exports and is now rapidly moving into
industrial exports. While it may still have a multiple protective tariff
system and thus be more "closed" in the real sense than some optimum
degree of free trade might dictate, it will rely quite heavily on the use of
the formal exchange rate system to handle current account problems.
The typical problem for such an economy, unless it happens to be an oil
exporter, is how to manage its exchange rate and internal macropolicies
over time in face of a large structural deficit, as part of its long-run trade
and development strategy.
Under reasonable assumptions it will be an optimal strategy for this
economy to borrow abroad to finance a large deficit in the early stages of
industrialization and to use these funds to develop its exports, providing
the internal rate of return lies above the marginal social cost of foreign
borrowing. Subsequently it will pay back these loans as the economy
approaches independence. In the course of the growth process the real
effective exchange rate will usually be required to grow over time, and it
should do so at a rate that equals the difference between the internal and
external real rate of return to capital (see Bruno 1976). This statement
must be modified in the case where relative technical progress in export—
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as compared to home—industries (or when the country's relative export
price in world markets) is sufficiently high to make actual growth in the
real exchange rate unnecessary. Even then it is usually the case that a real
exchange rate level has to be maintained over time.
Governments, of course, seldom know how to solve optimality prob-
lems, nor do they know the path of long-run foreign credit availabilities
with any certainty. More often than not, they have to live from hand to
mouth. Yet the logic of theoretical constructs may still be followed in at
least some respects. The marginal cost of foreign loans must not exceed
the internal profitability of the resulting investment, and the tariff (or
subsidy) inclusive real exchange rate must be related to the size of the
allowable structural deficit. The main point is that there should be a clear
long-run relationship between the ratio of present and future real ex-
change rates and between the internal and external real rates of interest.
These simultaneously affect long-run borrowing, domestic savings and
investment policies, as well as the real exchange rate as an allocative
device.
Problems occur when short-term market prices do not give the "cor-
rect" long-run allocation signals for producers or consumers. Two major
sources for such discrepancies may arise in the present context, both
working in the same direction. The world financial market may tempo-
rarily register very low (or even negative) real rates of interest for short-
and medium-run loans,
1 as it has done for some time in the 1970s and until
very recently. The other, often more important, problem is that domestic
stabilization policy, with its associated restrictive monetary policy, may
cause the real marginal cost of domestic credit to rise considerably above
the desired long-run rate. Either one of these or a combined opening up
of the gap between the two interest rate signals will, in the absence of
other intervention, cause substantial short-run capital inflows and a real
appreciation of the exchange rate, depressing manufacturing exports and
profits, an experience recently shared by a number of countries in Latin
America
2 and elsewhere.
Prolonged periods of real exchange appreciation accompanying short-
run capital inflow, when the long-run horizon dictates the converse, may
not be harmful from the point of view of financial portfolio allocations.
These are easily reversed at the cost of a phone call. They may, however,
be costly in terms of irreversible production and investment decisions,
which by nature have long gestation periods. This argument, of course,
1. The typical loan in the new post-1973 private capital market, even if taken for a
long-run investment purpose, is basically short-run in nature, insofar as the interest rate has
to be renegotiated at short-run intervals.
2. As noted in Diaz Alejandro's chapter in this volume (chapter 1), this problem was
also relevant in the 1930s.133 Real vs. Financial Openness under Alternative Exchange Rates
depends on some myopia in the expectation formation process of inves-
tors. Given the market imperfections in a typical semi-industrialized
country, this is a reasonable assumption to make.
This type of conflict between short-term and long-term asset pricing
also raises the question of financial openness, as distinct from real open-
ness of a country. Real openness relates to the degree of substitutability
of goods across borders and the efficiency advantages to be reaped from
reducing intervention in the free flow of real trade. Financial openness
has to do with the substitutability of foreign and domestic financial assets
and the extent of interference with free capital mobility. Since the ex-
change rate enters the pricing of both tradable assets and tradable goods,
conflicts of price signaling may occur when financial openness is pursued
along with real openness.
We shall assume here that the problem of relating long-term borrowing
(and investment) to the development strategy has somehow been taken
care of, and we may, for our purposes, consider the long-run capital
imports as largely determined outside the present framework. This leaves
the question of openness toward the world financial market for short-run
capital movements. Also, how does financial, as distinct from real, open-
ness relate to the operation of the economy under alternative exchange
rate regimes?
After laying out a simple analytical framework (section 6.2), we shall
consider the main alternative exchange rate regimes and their bearing on
macroeconomic management in the light of the extent of real and finan-
cial openness of the country. The regimes to be considered are a fixed
peg, with or without a "crawling" commercial policy; the crawling peg;
and the managed float (sections 6.3-6.5). This being a conference on the
capital market, we shall emphasize the implications of different degrees
of capital mobility under these regimes.
There is a separate question of how the extent of real and financial
openness restricts or enhances domestic stabilization policy. Thus for
brief transition periods it may pay to use the exchange rate as a price-
stabilizing device, even at the cost of "wrong" long-term signaling. The
last section (6.6) considers the two-way relationship of exchange rate
adjustment and the inflationary process. Should the exchange rate always
accommodate to the inflation rate (or overtake it), or can it sometimes be
used in the opposite direction to moderate an excessive rate of inflation?
While this and other problems seem to be a hot subject of debate in the
Latin American scene, I do not pretend to know enough about the
empirical background of these countries to go into analysis of actual
examples. This discussion has partly been inspired by the experiences of
my own country (see also Bruno and Sussman 1979,1980) which we hope
may also be relevant to a wider set of countries.134 Michael Bruno
6.2 Analytical Framework
We can represent the general equilibrium of the economy in a diagram
in which the real exchange rate (q = elp) and real money balances
(m = Mlp) appear on the two axes.
3 We shall consider the commodity
market, asset supply and demand, and the balance of payments.
6.2.1 Commodities
Suppose the economy produces a composite good (Q), priced/?, which
is an imperfect substitute for a world export good priced abroad atp* = 1.
Exports will be a positive function of their relative prices, q{\ + tx),
where q( = p*elp) is the real exchange rate, and tx is a possible export
subsidy. Imports (N) in this economy are assumed to be an input into the
productive system, together with labour (L), and capital (K), that is, we
have Q = Q(L, N, K). The short-run supply function is given by Q
s
[w, q(l + tn)p*; K], where w is the real wage (= W/p), tn is a tariff rate,
and p* is the relative world price of the import. Domestic absorption
depends on real income, the real money supply (m = Mlp), expected
inflation (IT),
4 and a fiscal impact variable (g).
Under the usual assumptions, we can represent the excess demands for





where U1 stands for a vector of various exogenous shift factors (g, w, IT, tx,
The downward-sloped curve QQ in figure 6.1 gives the combinations of
real exchange rate and real balances that keep the commodity market in
equilibrium (Q
d = Q
s). It will shift inward with an increase in the govern-
ment deficit (g), the real wage (w), expected inflation (TT), or any of the
other factors listed under U\. Above the curve there is excess demand,
and prices will tend to increase; below it there is excess supply, and prices
may or may not decrease depending on price stickiness. Since the price
level appears in the denominator of both variables on the axes, the
movement of prices in this diagram will always take place along a 45°
vector, toward the QQ curve.
3. At a later stage we shall put total real banking credit, instead of m, on the axis, see
section 6.5.
4. The variables m and -n enter firm asset market equilibrium (see below).
5. In this formulation we implicitly assume some real wage (w) rigidity, in which£ase the
labor market need not clear. In a fully flexible wage case, one should include —L as the
alternative parameter in Ux, assuming full employment. The basic form of equation (1)
would remain the same. The negative sign placed on K makes the vector Ux consist only of





6.2.2 The Basic Balance
The basic balance (7i) will here be defined as the difference between
exports and current import requirements plus exogenously given long-
run capital flows (F).
The reason for distinguishing between current import requirements
and what are normally registered as imports is to separate out the hoard-
ing element in imports and add it to the capital account. Thus, import
inventory movements will be a form of savings (in addition to being part
of investment). The idea of separating out part of capital imports as
receipts in the current account is meant to distinguish between long-run
transfers and loans, which are usually handled and determined centrally
by governments and will not affect private sector wealth directly, and
short-term capital flows (and changes in exchange reserves), which are
the only ones to be considered endogenous here. For simplicity, we
assume F to include foreign investment and to be defined net of interest
payments on the outstanding debt.136 Michael Bruno
We can now write
(2) T
+ +
where U2 is another vector of exogenous shift factors (F, tx, tn).
6
Current account balance is represented by the horizontal line in figure
6.1, at a given real exchange rate q0 = eo/po. Below the line there is a
deficit in the basic balance (71 < 0), above it there is a surplus (T1>0). The
adjustment when out of balance depends on the total balance of pay-
ments position and the exchange rate regime of which discussion is
deferred for the moment. The NX line shifts up with a fall in F or an
overall reduction in import tariffs and export subsidies.
7
6.2.3 Money and Other Assets
There are three kinds of privately held assets in the system in addition
to the capital stock: government bonds (Bg) carrying a nominal interest
rate i, domestic money (M), and a foreign currency denominated asset
(Z). The latter could, in principle, include paper money, an interest-
bearing asset (net of debt and carrying an interest rate /*), or inventories
of imported goods. For simplicity, we shall ignore the foreign interest
rate and only take into account the expected rate of devaluation (e).
Money demand (M
d) is a negative function of the nominal rate of
interest (i) and is proportional to gross output (Q). The money market is
in equilibrium with given money supply (M).
(3) M
dlp = \{i)Q =
For high rates of expected inflation, TT may be substituted for i in (3).
As is usually assumed, only domestic residents holds M, while both
domestic and foreign residents may hold Z. The relative demand for the
foreign asset (Z
d) is assumed to take the following simple form (see Miles





d = k{ e ),
+
where q = e/p as before, and e is the expected rate of depreciation.
8 The
more elastic k, the closer substitutes are M and Z.
6. For simplicity we ignore the need to modify (2) when the commodity market is not
balanced. Actually the NX line should have a kink at the point of intersection with QQ.
When Q
d<Q
s, imports are a function of Q
d which in turn depends positively on m.
7. When we are in a multiple-tariff world, this need no longer be the case. Sometimes a
tariff-cutting process may actually improve the current account. Even the case schematically
given here, where there may be a common tariff on imports which is different from the
export subsidy, could lead to this result.
8. The demand for government bonds (Bg) is not specified separately since it can be
derived as a residual once total asset demand (supply) is given. If the latter is denoted by a,
we get from (3) and (4) that the demand for real bonds (b
d) is: b
d = a - K(i) Q[\ + k(e)].137 Real vs. Financial Openness under Alternative Exchange Rates
If total short-term foreign exchange assets held in the economy are B
and central bank foreign exchange reserves are A, actual private assets
(Z) will always equal the difference Z = B - A. B may change only as a
result of an imbalance in the basic account as defined above, thus it will be
assumed to be given at any moment of time. Foreign exchange reserves
(A) may or may not be determined by the central bank, depending on the
foreign exchange regime (see below).
If both the markets for M and Z are in balance, equation (4) can be
turned into an asset market equilibrium relationship: q = mk(e)/(B-A).
This is represented by the line ZM in figure 6.1. To allow for different
degrees of financial openness, we assume that the actual change in the
privately held foreign exchange asset (AZ) is proportional to the desired
change Z
d — Zo from any initial level, Zo = Bo — Ao, while the money




The relationship between asset formation and the balance of payments
is taken up next.
6.2.4 The Balance of Payments
The balance of payments consists of the sum of the basic balance (7j)
and the short-run capital account (7^), which in turn equals the net sale of
private foreign exchange assets (— AZ). The overall balance of payments
surplus (T— Tx + T2) must equal the net accumulation of bank reserves
We can thus write:
(6) T = Tx{q) + P[B0-A0- k(e)m/q] = T(q, m; U3) = AA , + -
where U3 includes all the shift variables appearing in U2 as well as
(Bo-Ao, -e).
The line ZM in figure 6.1 represents the short-run capital account
balance (T2 = 0). Its slope is k{e)l{B0 — Ao). Above it T2>0 and below it T2 < 0. The curve TTwhich represents the overall balance (T=0) must lie
between the lines NX and ZM. Below it T<0 and above it 7>0.
This two-part graphical representation of the balance of payments,
which was inspired by Frenkel and Rodriguez (1980), is also useful for
considering different degrees of capital mobility.
9 A very low level of p
(relatively flat TT curve) would correspond to the case of rather effective
9. We differ from their presentation in using the pair of real variables (q, m) on the axes
rather than the nominal e and/? and in having Tx separate from the goods market. The capital
flow term in their paper is written directly as a function of the interest differential
[/ - (/* + e)]. There is some advantage in relating the capital flow to the underlying asset
behavior.138 Michael Bruno
exchange controls. In the extreme case ((3 = 0), only the current account
matters. The other polar extreme ((3 = °°) is the one in which only asset
behavior (T2 = 0) matters. There is instantaneous adjustment of Z to Z
d
(as in Dornbusch 1976).
6.2.5 The Banking Balance Sheet
We end this preliminary description by stating the basic balance-sheet
restriction of the banking system, within which monetary policy operates.
Denoting central bank credit to the government by Cg, to the private
sector by Cc, and private banking credit to the private sector by Cp we
have:
(7) M = eA + Cg + Cc + Cp.
For subsequent reference we also note that by adding the net foreign
exchange asset eZ to the left-hand side of (7) and remembering that
A + Z = B, we get another constraint on the sum of the two assets:
1
0
(8) M + eZ = eB + C,
where C = Cg + Cc + Cp is total bank credit.
6.3 Operating a Fixed Peg under Limited Capital Mobility
We first consider the process of large-step adjustment of the exchange
rate in response to shifts in the basic balance under a pegged exchange
rate regime. An important issue in the present context is the limitation
imposed by the role of expectations of exchange rate change and of
short-run capital movements even when the economy is relatively
(though not absolutely) closed to financial capital movements. These
pose considerable short-term stabilization problems, especially for
monetary policy. Let us discuss these problems and possible remedies.
Consider a fixed exchange rate economy with initial equilibrium at a
nominal exchange rate e0, quantity of money Mo, and price level p0 (see
fig. 6.2). Commodity market equilibrium is given by the curve QQ, the
basic balance is given by NX. There is limited capital mobility (low (3), so
that the balance of payments equilibrium is given by the line TT whose
slope is assumed to be between 0 and 1. Given are low expectations of
exchange rate change (e = e0, which may be zero). Suppose now that for
some reason there is a shift in the basic balance (NX shifts up) which may
be caused by a long-term fall in lending (F). A real devaluation from q0 to
q1 is called for. For simplicity, assume that the change is confined to the
10. If B is added on the left-hand side, we get total financial assets (M + eZ + Bg) as
financed from the three major sources: the basic balance (eB), the government deficit
(Cg + Bg), and the banking system's finance to the private sector (Cc + Cp).139 Real vs. Financial Openness under Alternative Exchange Rates
current account and QQ is not immediately affected.
1
1 A possible new
equilibrium for the economy would be at point B which is given at the
intersection of NX' and the old ZM line, assuming that after the change
its slope k(eo)/(B — A) and Z remain the same. A set of policies that
might bring this about could be a combination of a nominal devaluation
to eu fiscal and income restraint, a reduction in g or w (shifting QQ to
QQ'), plus an increase in M to M1 so that MXIMQ = eile0. Unless prices are downward rigid, the same real movement in Mlp and elp could also be
achieved by a fall in p, keeping M constant ( = M0), coupled with a
smaller nominal devaluation. We are less interested in the exact final
11. An exactly analogous situation would be created by an inflationary shift in the
commodity market. Suppose we start at B on QQ' and NX' and for some reason (e.g., an
increase in the budget deficit or in the real wage) QQ' shifts inward to QQ. Assuming the
line AB to be on a 45° vector, inflation will move the economy back to equilibrium at A.
From here on the analysis is the same.140 Michael Bruno
outcome than in the dynamic sequence of events that may typically occur
once the need for a step devaluation is signaled.
It is in the nature of a fixed exchange rate regime that a considerable lag
exists between the first signal of a required change in e and the actual act
of a devaluation, let alone the implementation of the internal demand
restrictions that have to accompany it. The moment TTshifts toward TV
and foreign exchange reserves start falling (A A <0), two processes may
be set in motion, one having to do with expectations, the other with
fluctuations in the money base. As expectations of a devaluation rise
(e1>e0), there is import hoarding and delayed repatriation of export
proceeds. The asset equilibrium curve rotates upward to ZM', say, with
the balance of payments equilibrium line shifting to TT". The result is a
more intensive fall in reserves than would otherwise take place, signaling
a larger devaluation than may objectively be required.
This can be illustrated as follows: given the expectation of a devalua-
tion, a new temporary equilibrium could take place at point H. One way
of exactly reaching H could be a nominal devaluation from A to G,
keeping M constant, followed by a price increase (because of an inflation-
ary gap in the goods market) which is represented by an inward move
along a 45° vector from G to H. Whether the real exchange rate is above
or below the level balancing the new basic account (NX') depends on the
extent of the excessive, expectations-induced shift of TT" which, in turn,
depends on the asset-demand response to expectations change (dk/de)
and the effectiveness of foreign exchange control (p). Once a devaluation
has taken place, expectations will stabilize again (at e0, or some lower
number). Suppose ZM returns to its previous position and balance of
payments equilibrium is represented by TT. At point H, for example,
there is now a surplus with renewed capital inflow (repatriation of export
proceeds, dishoarding of import inventories, etc.) which more than com-
pensates for the remaining basic deficit, and reserves will start rising
again.
So far we have ignored changes in nominal money which can be
assumed away only if there is central bank sterilization of the fluctuations
in exchange reserves.
1
2 This brings us to the second dynamic process
which may take place simultaneously with the one previously described.
Let us go back to point A when foreign exchange reserves start falling.
Unless sterilized, there will be a fall in M which in figure 6.2 would show
as a horizontal leftward move from A toward D. Excess supply and
unemployment develop unless prices (and wages) are downward flexible.
Again, a possible move under price flexibility would be a fall in M by the
amount DA and a reduction of prices along a 45° vector from D to E. If
12. Equilibrium at H or at E here implies a fall in real balances from M0/p0 to Molpx through a price rise.141 Real vs. Financial Openness under Alternative Exchange Rates
expectations of a devaluation are kept at zero, the balance of payments
would have reached temporary equilibrium at E without a devaluation
but through a monetary squeeze and a forced deflation.
If prices are inflexible, the monetary contraction and the deepening
slump could in principle continue until an unemployment equilibrium is
reached at F.
1
3 It is the capital flows in response to the interest rate gap
1
4
that will finance the basic deficit. Obviously, this is neither a sustainable
nor a socially desirable equilibrium. What usually happens is that the
internal pressure on the monetary authorities makes for monetary expan-
sion to counterbalance the loss of reserves.
The counterpart of this phenomenon, after an excessive devaluation, is
the reverse upward pressure on the money supply coming from the
renewed capital inflow and the rising reserves. Suppose we are temporar-
ily at H when the balance of payments equilibrium is given by TT. Lack
of monetary restraint (and legitimate pressure on the part of sectors hurt
by the real credit squeeze) will cause M to rise. In terms of figure 6.2,
there will be a movement along a horizontal line from H toward TT. At
the same time inflationary pressure develops causing a rise in prices
(move back toward QQ).
The large swings in short-run capital movements and in the money
before and after large devaluations are hard to contain even under
exchange controls and constitute one of their main drawbacks (see Bruno
and Sussman 1979 for an account of the Israeli experience). The pressure
to keep real money and credit high (e.g., for investment) may cause a
continued inflationary process driving down the real exchange rate to a
renewed balance of payments deficit, unless the devaluation is coupled
with the appropriate measures that will shift QQ outward.
1
5
If exchange controls are tight ((3 = 0) and the original level of real
balances is desired, an equilibrium devaluation could be reached at C
providing there is a sufficient accompanying budget cut to move the QQ
line through that point. If controls are not tight and there are capital
flows, temporary equilibrium could be reached at N, say, with a smaller
budget cut and smaller real devaluation. This, however, can only be
temporary since the current account deficit will gradually erode foreign
exchange assets and require further cuts in the budget deficit, and an
additional increase in elp to make room for the expanded production of
tradable goods, as TT gradually shifts up. Only a larger budget cut to
13. Strictly speaking, equilibrium will probably take place at a point right of F(since now
Q = &<&).
14. This may sometimes take the form of active government encouragement to firms to
take foreign credit, which is expensive from a social point of view but is relatively cheap
given the prevailing higher domestic interest rates.
15. The analysis was conducted with a given commodity market curve. When QQ shifts
inward due to a rise in inflationary expectations or in real wages, these problems are clearly
accentuated.142 Michael Bruno
QQ' (and/or a larger drop in the real wage, coupled with a rise in m and
q) can keep all markets in new, current-account equilibrium at point B.
The main problems that arise in the operation of a fixed peg which is
adjusted in large jumps thus center around the sizable accompanying
fluctuations in real reserves and in the money supply and the large
one-time adjustments required in other expenditure items. The latter are
unavoidable under any exchange rate regime, since a real resource trans-
fer will always be required (unless there is a slack in the system which can
be diverted to the tradable goods sector). On the other hand, the mone-
tary upheavals and the real loss of reserves could in principle be delayed if
the real exchange rate corrections are confined to the current account.
Short of moving to a regime of small-step adjustment in the formal rate,
one may operate the fixed formal peg on capital account transactions
while correcting the real effective exchange rate in smaller steps through
adjustments in commercial policy.
Consider the case in which we have a pure dual rate on the two
accounts—a uniform tariff (tn) on imports and a subsidy of the same rate
(tx = tn) on exports. When Ffalls, as in the above discussion, one could in
principle increase tn and tx to keep the NXXme, in place, while manipulat-
ing the budget to compensate for the loss in revenue (when the balance is
in deficit). In that case the economy may stay in equilibrium at A while at
the same time reducing the basic deficit.
Countries hardly ever operate a uniform tariff rate on imports. How-
ever, a close substitute for the above idea is a flat export subsidy based on
value added. Israel had operated such a system quite successfully through
the 1960s and part of the 1970s. Large devaluations would take place only
once every few years and in between the rate of export subsidy (and
sometimes also the tariff rate on imports) would be adjusted upward
gradually. The problem with such a system is usually two-fold. One
problem is that it tends to get abused once the subsidy rate reaches high
levels. There is considerable incentive to cheat in the calculation of value
added which leads to trade distortions and the like. The other difficulty is
that such measures usually meet with strong disapproval of the interna-
tional agencies (e.g., GATT and IMF). It can be claimed that when used
in small measure and with some prudence such a system may nonetheless
have its merits. The alternatives, as we shall see, have their drawbacks
too.
6.4 The Pros and Cons of a Crawling Peg
We now keep the assumption of a formal peg but assume that the
adjustments are made in very small steps and at frequent intervals.
1
6
16. In the Israeli case the crawling peg was operated for two years, between June 1975
and October 1977, and at first followed rather rigid rules but then became quite flexible in
terms of size of change and allowed frequency of adjustment (see Bruno and Sussman 1980).143 Real vs. Financial Openness under Alternative Exchange Rates
The advantage of a crawling peg over the previous regime lies in the
two areas where the large-step adjustment regime is weakest. It usually
avoids the political and social taboo attached to an act of currency
depreciation and shifts the exchange rate adjustments from the front
pages of the newspapers to back-page financial columns. The major
exchange reserve crises and monetary upheavals may be avoided.
One by-product of the crawling peg is that no major political decisions
or restrictive internal policies have to be taken at each step. This apparent
advantage of minidevaluations sometimes may also be, paradoxically, a
source of major weakness. In a government-deficit and inflation-prone
economy the operation of the exchange rate is delegated to a ministerial
or bank committee without the accompanying continuous urge for small-
step fiscal and income policy discipline.
1
7 The fact that devaluations now
take on a more continuous form make for built-in inflationary expecta-
tions (i — Tx — e —ele), thus exacerbating inflationary pressures.
Under a crawling peg, especially if it is predetermined, the capital
account curve no longer fluctuates. Suppose expectations are fixed at ej
and the relevant asset demand curve is ZM' in figure 6.2, with equilib-
rium momentarily at K. Say a small-step adjustment to a new balance of
payments curve TT" is required. The small triangle marked by the points
K, L, and H marks the policy trade-offs. If fiscal policy can be used along
with a minidevaluation, we may move from K to LOT at least refrain from
getting a fall in real balances (i.e., maintain real credit levels). If fiscal or
real wage restraint cannot take place, real money balances will have to
fall as we move from K to H, by a cut in nominal money, by inflation, or
by both. One of the problems of the crawling peg is the continuous
built-in pressure for monetary restraint to keep domestic interest rates
high relative to (7* + e). To illustrate, at point K on ZM', m has to be
lower than at TV or at B.
6.5 High Capital Mobility and Flexible Rates
So far we have considered regimes in which the authorities directly peg
the exchange rate, in which case the balance of payments need not be in
momentary equilibrium and foreign exchange reserves are the short-run
buffer. In section 6.1 we posed the problem of conflicting long-term and
short-term price signaling. This may occur in a situation of relatively high
capital mobility and exchange rate flexibility, to which we now turn.
Consider the case in which the exchange rate automatically adjusts to
equilibrate the exchange market. It helps to discuss first the case of a
flexible rate under perfect asset mobility (p = 0) and no intervention
(AA = 0).
17. E.g., it may be easier to convince the trade unions of the need to forego one step in
the indexation mechanism in a national crisis situation than to reduce indexation on a
continuous basis.144 Michael Bruno
In an inflationary situation and when the foreign asset is highly liquid
[fc(e) is elastic], it may sometimes be advantageous to use total bank
credit (C = Cg + Cc + Cp) rather than M as the financial instrument. The
commodity market equilibrium curve QQ can be expressed in terms of
c = CIp (instead of m) and elp, keeping all other properties as before (see
fig. 6.3). The asset curve can be transformed by substituting from equa-
tion (8) into (4) and writing Z
d = B - A to get:
(9) elp -
k(e)
- [1 + k(e)]A
Op,
Equation (9) is represented by the curve ZC in figure 6.3 which has
analogous properties to the curve ZM. It is a ray through the origin whose
slope increases with e and A and falls with B. Equilibrium takes place at
the intersection of the asset market line (ZC) and the commodity market
QQ (point A). In case of a disturbance, the exchange rate immediately
adjusts to equilibrate the asset market first. Consider, as before, the case
q = e/p
ZC
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in which there is an increase in the basic deficit (NX to NX') and, for
simplicity, assume first that there is no change in the commodity market.
The only channel by which this may have an effect on the economy is the
asset market, through a possible impact effect on expectations (e) and a
long-run effect on the total supply of foreign exchange assets (B). Sup-
pose there is a one-time effect on e rotating ZC to ZC. The nominal (and
real) exchange rate will overshoot to point E and may quickly be eroded
by inflation with real appreciation moving the economy from E to G
along line ZC. At point G the balance of payments is in short-run
equilibrium, but there is a sustained basic deficit. This may disappear
over time only gradually as B falls and the ZC curve continues to rotate
upward. Final equilibrium will take place only when the asset equilibrium
line and the commodity market line intersect at the new basic balance
equilibrium (see point C). The story is only slightly modified if we
consider that the disturbance that has shifted the basic balance (NX) also
shifts the commodity market (e.g., shift of QQ to Q'Q' as would happen
in the case of an increase in import prices).
There are some clear drawbacks to this automatic adjustment process.
One is that in the first stage there may be an excessive price increase with
no real benefits to the current account. This is only one example of the
"overshooting" tendency of an exchange regime in which the asset mar-
ket takes a major role in the short-run determination of the exchange rate
(cf. Dornbusch 1976, and the related literature). Similar effects charac-
terize the case of unexpected domestic monetary changes. For example, a
monetary expansion from A to B raises expectations of a depreciation,
causes a jump of the exchange rate to point F on ZC, say, followed by
inflation (more from F to G). The case of monetary contraction, from A
to H, which may be needed to correct a commodity market imbalance (at
QQ') leads to an appreciation (point R) coupled with excessive unem-
ployment, unless prices are downward flexible.
The main drawback of asset market determination in the present
context, quite apart from overshooting, is that the process of adjustment
to a new long-run situation may be much too slow. The real exchange rate
that is signaled by the asset market (at point G, say) does not reflect the
true long-run rate from the point of view of real resource allocation.
Given the gestation lags of exports and of investment in export industries
and the imperfections in the expectation formation mechanism, this
would seem to be the major cost of allowing short-run capital movements
to determine the exchange rate.
One way of avoiding this signaling problem is to impose a direct tax on
capital imports as was done in a recent Israeli episode (see Liviatan 1980;
Bruno and Sussman 1980). In figure 6.3 this can be shown by noting that
the imposition of a tax (T) on capital imports is the same as raising the
expected cost of foreign borrowing and thus causing the asset market146 Michael Bruno
curve to rotate in the required direction (say, from ZC to ZC"). This may
not overcome the overshooting problem but may, at least, avoid over-
valuation of the currency.
1
8 A managed float, which takes the form of
intervention in the foreign exchange market, in principle works in the
same direction. Purchase of foreign exchange by the central bank raises
foreign exchange reserves (A) and also rotates ZC counterclockwise.
What happens when capital mobility is not perfect and we do not have
instantaneous arbitrage? Overshooting will clearly be mitigated. Con-
sider again the case in which the current account flows also play a role in
the market. Suppose that with the projected increase in the basic deficit
balance of payments equilibrium is represented by the curve TV (shifted
from TT and assuming no immediate change in expectations). Under a
float the exchange rate jumps to D and then adjusts along TT to G. Note
that there is less overshooting (and less inflation) in this case. If we now
also assume a shift in expectations, the new equilibrium will be at a higher
point, Gi, on QQ. Obviously, the flatter the mine, the more important
the basic balance is in the determination of market signals and the closer a
float will bring us to the long-run signal.
Does this analysis imply that it is always advantageous to control
capital movements, that is, limit financial openness for the sake of real
openness? One should be careful not to jump to hasty conclusions. If it
were possible to draw an absolute distinction between short-run and
long-run capital movements in practice, then such a conclusion could
perhaps be justified. However, we should bear in mind that the way we
have distinguished between capital movements in terms of exogenously
determined long-run funds (F) and endogenous short-term capital is
somewhat artificial. Excessive foreign exchange controls could also drive
away legitimate long-run capital, which may thus affect the options for
the real economy (i.e., shift the NX curve). The costs and benefits must
be weighed against each other. In any case, the argument for financial
closeness may often be confined to particular short-term situations.
6.6 Exchange Rate Adjustment and Inflation:
Accommodation versus Moderation
The last issue to be discussed briefly is the relationship between ex-
change rate change and inflation. This brings up the case in which
short-run stabilization may take the lead over long-run objectives in
exchange rate pricing. Specifically, should the rate of devaluation always
be made to accommodate (or overtake) the inflation rate for the sake of
18. Note, however, that the imposition of a tax on capital imports has another negative
by-product in the form of high domestic interest rates which may harm investment. The
movement from A to C obviously involves a real credit squeeze which may be voluntary,
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the long-run external balance? Or are there situations in which it pays to
moderate exchange rate changes as a short-run stabilization device even
at the cost of a real loss of reserves?
For simplicity, we shall conduct the discussion in terms of steady state
rates of change, p and e, and assume consistency of expectations, that is,
ir = p and e = e.
One basic short-term relationship between the rates of inflation and
depreciation in an open economy can be derived from the commodity and
labor markets and represents the price-wage-price dynamic adjustment
process. In reduced form this can be written as follows:
(10) p = IT0 + ae.
The "path-through" coefficient a incorporates the role of the direct
and indirect import coefficient as well as the implied wage-price linkages.
The a is most likely to be less than one, providing we do not have 100
percent indexation. The intercept 7T0 summarizes the role of excess
demand factors in the commodity and labor markets as well as auton-




Equation (10) appears as the line PP in figure 6.4, with intercept Tr0 on
the TT-axis and slope a < 1. Given any rate of depreciation (e), this curve
gives the implied inflation rate that will be propagated by the real system
given its underlying behavioral and institutional parameters. This infla-
tion rate can in principle be lowered either by a reduction in the extent of
linkage (a) or by fiscal and other stabilization measures, lowering TT0. In
practice it is unlikely that the slope can be changed much (except momen-
tarily under special circumstances), while the intercept of the PP line is
more amenable to policy change.
Line XX in figure 6.4 represents the long-run depreciation that keeps
the current account in balance. The intercept e0 (which may be zero or
even negative) reflects the effect of the expected long-run reduction in
capital flows net of autonomous time shifts in the basic balance (due to
productivity growth, relative world price changes, etc.).
2
0
A crawl that achieves steady state equilibrium under these assumptions
is given at the rate e2, which is consistent with an inflation rate of TT2 (see
point A in fig. 6.4). More restrictive internal policies (showing in a lower
PP' curve) will allow a lower rate of depreciation, el5 with a correspond-
ingly reduced inflation rate (cf. point C with ^4).
If there is a high degree of capital mobility in the system, the momen-
19. Ifwewritep = (ie + (1 - $)W + d, W= yp + €, we get/? = TT0 + ae, where a = T|p,
TT0 = t\[d + (1 - p)€], and T\ = [1 - (1 - Ph]"
1. a = 1 if and only if 7 = 1. This can also be
expanded to incorporate real balance effects.
20. If we denote the autonomous time shift of Tx by T|r and the elasticity of 7} with respect







tary equilibrium rate of inflation will not be given by the line XX,
however, but rather by the combination of e and p that keep the asset
market in balance over time (line ZZ in fig. 6.4).
This can be obtained by time differentiation of equation (9), leading to
an asset equilibrium rate of real depreciation e - p = £0, where £0 is
 a
positive function of the rate of change of real credit (c), central bank
intervention in reserves (AA), and the rate of change of expectations
(e),
2
1 and depends negatively on the basic balance (T1 = A5).
In figure 6.4 the intercept of ZZ on the p axis measures - £0- If ZZ
happens to coincide with line XX (£0 is then positive), the system is in full
steady state equilibrium at A. If ZZ lies to the left and above XX,
however, there may be a difference between the rate of inflation that
keeps the asset market in balance and that which is propagated by the real
economy, at any given announced rate of depreciation (compare point E
with A).
22 If left to itself, the fall in Tx will gradually shift the ZZ curve
21. AA and € will be zero in equilibrium, but appear here since they can be used as policy
instruments, along with c.
22. One could argue that in this case the expected rate of inflation may be TT3 while the
actual rate is ir2. If e2 is maintained and expectations play an important role, actual inflation
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down toward XX. Now suppose that the ZZ curve is deliberately shifted
up to its position in figure 6.4 through a credit squeeze and by allowing
reserves to fall (— AA > 0). At the same time the authorities preannounce
a lower rate of depreciation (e: < e2). Equilibrium can now take place at a
lower rate of inflation (TTI<TT2 at point B), providing these steps are
credible.
2
3 If the stabilization program also affects the real economy, TT0,
is brought down to TTQ while the crawl and the expected inflation rate are
further reduced (point D). At this stage the economy may be ready for
renewed growth (raise c, e) and a shift to a new long-run rate of devalua-
tion (ej) at C.
The sequence of steps A-B-D-C may be a more feasible one to achieve
than an attempt at a direct move from A to C. The main difference is that
one uses the exchange rate much more drastically as a stabilizing device
(at D, e is almost zero), but one pays the cost in terms of short-term debt
(or loss of reserves). This is an example in which short-term capital flows
are deliberately used as a stabilizing device at the expense of long-term
signaling. The main problem in practice is the speed at which these
adjustments can be made to be credible and the size of the real social cost
in terms of transitional production and employment slowdown.
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Comment Peter M. Garber
In his paper, Michael Bruno constructs a framework for exploring the
effects of various policy combinations on the dynamics of the real ex-
change rate, real interest rates, income, and elements of the balance of
payments accounts. The focus of the study is to determine how such
policy combinations may affect the reestablishment of an economy's
long-term equilibrium after a disturbance in markets entering the current
account balance. The discussion of policy choice is complicated because it
considers a number of government objectives, many potential economic
environments, and a large number of possible policy tools. Government
objectives include a desire to maintain full employment, to allocate
properly available capital among different investment projects, and to
establish equilibrium in the balance of payments. The environment in
which the economy operates may have either fixed or flexible prices and
wages. Local capitalists may lack the ability or information to predict
optimally the future course of the real interest rate dictated by the
dynamics of the economy's path to a new equilibrium. More generally,
expectations of other price changes may move sluggishly or they may
display perfect foresight. Finally, the available policy tools are the use of
commercial policy, the ability to impose exchange controls on short-term
debt movements, control of domestic credit, fiscal policy, and the use of
fixed versus flexible exchange rates.
Since many combinations of these objectives, policies, and environ-
ments are possible, the paper constructs an analytical framework of loci
of equilibrium in the goods market, the current account, the short-term
capital account, and the balance of payments. The framework is then
used to gain a qualitative notion of the dynamics that may arise under
alternative policies.
My comments are intended to suggest that these myriad scenarios can
be unified by treating them as policies to be imposed by a government
conditional on the behavior of some endogenous variables of interest to
the government. Thus, the policies need not be treated as independent
alternatives used to impose a single dynamic path on the economy.
Rather, in line with the paper's emphasis on dynamics, they can be
viewed as a sequence of policies which switch the economy's laws of
motion from time to time as particular contingencies arise. That the
government's policies may switch in the future will affect current prices
and their dynamics if rational expectations or, as in this paper, perfect
foresight is assumed. In this light, Bruno's paper can be interpreted as an
exploration of the dynamics associated with a large number of "pure"
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policies; the next step is to weight these policies together to determine
prices, using the probabilities that the contingencies on which they de-
pend will materialize.
Of course, given the large number of possible policy combinations and
contingency rules of thumb for their implementation, this is no easy task.
The mere notion that there is one metapolicy which imposes policies
according to given contingencies leads, as Sargent (1980) suggests, to the
problem of the existence of free will. Aside from the philosophical
problem, to study the system's dynamics, even with only a few markets
and a few policy choices available, is a very large problem in differential
or difference equations. Here I will simply point out a few examples of
work that has been done to give a flavor of the potential of employing
Bruno's results in this direction.
In the context of a fixed exchange rate model with a drain on a
country's foreign reserve holdings, it is possible to foresee a run on a
country's reserve which will either force a devaluation or a system of
floating exchange rates. Bruno discusses this sort of situation in which the
policy generating domestic credit may be incompatible with a viable fixed
exchange rate system. Krugman (1979) and Flood and Garber (19816)
have shown how a foreseeable exchange market collapse will affect the
dynamics of a country's exchange holdings. In these models the time of
the end of a fixed exchange rate and a switch to a floating rate can be
determined both by the agents in the economy and by the researcher.
Conversely, under certain contingencies a country may wish to switch
from a floating exchange rate to a monetary policy which would fix the
exchange rate, as in the British case in the 1920s. In Flood and Garber
(1981a) the effects of such a regime switch on the current exchange rate
and its dynamics are derived, together with a probability density function
over the time of the switch.
Similarly, in the dual exchange rate system mentioned by Bruno in the
context of using commercial policy, one can foresee situations in which
the exchange rates will be unified. This affects the current values of the
exchange rates in both the current and capital accounts, as demonstrated
by Flood and Marion (1981).
The above papers deal with switches in the exchange rate regime.
However, switches in other policies are possible. One of the major
features of Bruno's paper is the explicit statement of short-term asset
dynamics after exchange controls are imposed. Thus, we can envisage a
foreseeable policy switch from a situation of perfect capital mobility
(P = °°) to a situation of exchange controls (p<°°), with the switch
imposing different laws of motion on the system. More concretely, sup-
pose that the system is one of fixed exchange rates and that initially there
are no controls. Also, the government has a rule which states that under
some contingencies (e.g., too large a cumulative deficit in the balance of152 Michael Bruno
payments) a switch will be made to exchange controls. Finally, suppose
that the process determining domestic credit is such that foreign reserve
losses will eventually reach this limit. Then the knowledge that controls
will be imposed will affect both the current deficit and the time that the
limit is reached.
These examples all examine cases of a single policy switch. More
complicated are cases in which various policies will be imposed in se-
quence. Alternatively, a given contingency may cause a random switch to
a single policy from a set of possible alternatives. The tools used to study
the above examples would be applicable to this more complex problem.
While to my knowledge such multiple policy switches have not been
extensively studied, the numerous scenarios studied by Bruno would fit
naturally into such a framework.
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